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I. THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE EVOLVING ECONOMY: 
THE EXCEPTION TO THE PHRASE “SLOW AND STEADY WINS THE RACE” 
 
 
In mid October, The New York Times published an article musing over the 
prolonged attempt of Internet heavy-weight Groupon.com to go public.
1 
Reflecting a 
healthy medium between the projections of both the shortsighted cynics and those eager 
to jump aboard the cyber space band-wagon, the article placed Groupon’s initial offering 
of 30 million shares at an estimated $17 per share.
2 
The preliminary appraisal was 
respectable. In fact, several experts thought the NYT’s projection erred towards the side of 
overly generous. Financial analysts predicted Groupon would be unable to navigate 
successfully the rocky terrain and razor sharp cliffs comprising the admittedly precarious 
economic landscape. However on the day of Groupon’s highly anticipated IPO debut, the 
company was valued at a staggering $13 billion and the float was at 35 million shares 
going at $20 each!
3 
Surpassing most expectations, the November 4
th 
initial public 
offering landed Groupon the second-highest valuation of any technology company that 
 
has gone public since Google in 2004.
4 
Just a few months prior to Groupon’s big splash, 
Pandora.com was also able to raise a sufficient amount of media frenzy surrounding its 
initial public offering in June of 2011.
5 
The music radio website boasts around 94 million 
users, but remains notorious for its widely publicized inability to operate at anything but 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1 
Evelyn Rusli, Groupon Narrows Losses Ahead of Its Pitch to Investors, New York Times, (Oct. 21, 
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/groupon-nears-a-profit-and-seeks-16-to-18-a-share/. 
2 
Id. 
3 
Sarah Kessler, Is Groupon Really Worth $18 Billion?, Mashable, (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://mashable.com/2011/11/04/groupon-ipo-value/. 
4 
Id. 
5 
Leena Rao, Pandora Opens at $20 Per Share With a Market Cap of $3.2 Billion, techcrunch.com, (Jun. 
15, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/06/15/pandora-opens-at-20-per-share-with-a-market-cap-of-3-2- 
billion/.  
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a loss. Though Pandora has not turned a profit since its inception, it debuted a sizeable 
 
IPO estimated to be worth around $2.6 billion.
6
 
 
So what exactly is it with these websites? How are they worth such staggering 
amounts if they are unable to generate revenue? To pose the cliché, but increasingly 
relevant question: how do these companies plan to monetize? After all, they are not 
selling a tangible product. Pandora and Groupon do not produce anything a customer 
could find in a store- neatly packaged and placed on a shelf with a price tag and a one- 
year warranty. Where are the manufacturers and the factories? Where are the workers? 
Where are the warehouses packed full of products in hopeful anticipation of being this 
holiday season’s next big ticket item? The short answer: this infrastructure is rapidly 
ceasing to exist. 
With valuations leaving onlookers to inquire about the exact date of April Fools, 
the commotion surrounding the rapid growth of web and tech-based companies draws 
attention to a drastic transformation currently underway. Over the past few decades, a 
marked shift in the nature of commodities traded in the channels of commerce has 
occurred. The United States is no longer a country flourishing on the blood and sweat of 
each railroad tie laid into the ground. It is not even a country basking in the wealth 
formerly accompanying the permeation of mass produced goods like it was 50 years ago. 
Today, both the country and the economy are struggling with an international transition 
from a marketplace of tangible products, to one revolving around the exchange of 
information. Unprecedented levels of unemployment, government bailouts of financial 
giants and the protests of those occupying Wall Street evidence both a lurid degree of 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
6 
Id. 
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inadaptability and an unwillingness to recognize the drastic change in market forces that 
has recently occurred. 
The dawning of the “Information Age” introduced an era in which a multi-billion 
dollar marketplace of intangibles exists. In this day and age, the password to Justin 
Bieber’s Twitter account would likely sell on eBay for more than it cost to build the 
Titanic. The traditional brick and mortar business is slowly being eradicated by those 
focusing on access- access to information, access to customer lists, access to large 
numbers of consumers. Access with efficiency is perhaps the easiest characterization of 
new businesses capable of generating success in the current climate; this hypothesis 
garners support from a comparison of the growth rates of different industries. The 
technology and website sector continues to grow at an exponential rate, while virtually all 
other industries are declining or flat lining. In fact, e-commerce has been growing at an 
annual rate of 10% and is expected to be responsible for over 50% of retail sales in the 
United States by 2014.
7 
While this is a welcome forecast for the economy, it presents 
 
major obstacles for a judicial system that has demonstrated the evolutionary capability of 
a tyrannosaurus rex. 
Ambiguous case law coupled with an absence of statutory provisions concerning 
online commercial transactions attest for the legal system’s inability to recognize the 
occurrence of tremendous alterations to the infrastructure of the economy. Now more so 
than ever, the economy is not defined by national boundaries, but rather created by 
international players. Companies like Google and Facebook have in effect, surpassed the 
authority of the nation state by revolutionizing the ways in which business transactions 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
7 
Ethan Lyon, 20 Key Stats in ecommerce and Social Media, sparxoo.com, (Feb. 2011), 
http://sparxoo.com/2011/02/02/ecommerce-social-media-stats/. 
    5  
occur. Furthermore, these large multi-national corporations are able to retain a degree of 
control over online commercial dealings by insulating them from judicial regulation 
under a veil of private ownership. Specifically, the pre-eminence of search engines as 
well as the emergence of aggregator websites have come to dominate the e-commerce 
landscape, resulting in claims from those looking to regain a lost competitive advantage. 
Consider the following example: Jack, a law student, is looking to purchase a 
plane ticket to Florida for his winter break. Instead of looking for flights on Delta’s 
website or JetBlue’s website, he immediately begins his search at an aggregator site that 
pools all the possible flights from various airlines together allowing Jack to quickly and 
efficiently compare prices and select the best flight. This is quick and easy for Jack, but 
would he have gone directly to JetBlue’s site had Expedia.com not been available, thus 
bypassing the possibly of purchasing a ticket from Delta altogether? Does Expedia.com 
charge the airlines a commission percentage of flights purchased through its service? Do 
the airlines enter into private contracts with Expedia and Orbitz, paying a premium to the 
aggregators in exchange for the aggregator to direct customers to their airline more 
frequently? 
The judicial system clumsily responds to these questions and other similar claims 
by applying antiquated legal doctrines in an attempt to ameliorate the financial 
ramifications accompanying the increased use of search engines and aggregators. Most 
notably, trespass to chattels, misappropriation and trademark and copyright infringement 
claims have proved the most successful for those seeking to recoup a lost business 
advantage from a search engine and/or aggregator. However, these doctrines remain so 
heavily grounded in physical examples and evidence, they often (1) fail to address the 
    6  
lost economic advantage; (2) are applied haphazardly and with liberty to depart from the 
original theory in order to better fit the metaphysical online context; and (3) illustrate the 
judicial system’s inadaptability and blind reliance on tangible evidence. 
A recent poll of online shoppers reported that 47% of shoppers begin their 
product searches at an aggregator website.
8 
This exponential growth of information 
technology necessitates judicial recognition and development of policies better suited to 
resolve business disputes, rather than ones grounded in concrete boundaries. Instead of 
clinging to the soot covered smokestacks of yesteryear in a last ditch effort to make 
antiquated principles relevant, the judicial branch may find its efforts better spent 
accounting for the fusion between the economy and the Internet which has transformed 
the traditional notion of a business transaction into one that occurs without a firm 
handshake. 
The sections that follow take inventory of and evaluate the emergence of Internet 
search engines and information aggregators as they relate to the rapidly evolving diaspora 
of e-commerce. A (II) brief overview of the history and workings of search engines and 
aggregators is followed by a detailed look at the various causes of action brought against 
search engines and aggregators including, (III) trespass to chattels; (IV) breach of 
contractual obligations; (V) tortious interference with economic advantage; (VI) 
copyright and trademark infringement; and (VII) unfair competition and 
misappropriation. Each claim will be critically evaluated against the premise that the 
current rationale for each cause of action is unjustifiably predicated on proof of 
physicality and is therefore ill suited to mediate e-commerce disputes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
8 
Kurt Peters, Growth in Online Shopping Slows, But Channel Shift Continues, Internetretailer.com,  (Aug. 
2003), http://www.internetrailer.com/internet/marketing-conference/99510-state-industry.html/. 
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II. A MICRO-BLOGGING  MINUTE ON SEARCH ENGINES AND AGGREGATORS 
 
The World Wide Web became publically available in August of 1991.
9 
It 
was not until 1994 that web crawler and Lycos, the first full text search engine became 
available. These products enabled the user to search the Internet by keyword but not by 
content.
10 
Just 10 years later, the Yahoo! Search index was able to provide access to over 
20 billion web documents, images, audio and video files.
11 Today’s search engines have 
 
the capability to return results originating from a keyword, content, photographs, 
popularity among users and even geocoding- a process that provides information based 
on a user’s geographic location. 
More importantly however, are the effects of advertising on search results and the 
consequences involved when a price tag accompanies the receipt of supposedly free 
information. Though they remain lucrative, traditional types of advertising such as 
display ads have given way to paid placement and paid inclusion advertisements. Paid 
placement links an advertisement to a search term, while paid inclusion involves the 
advertiser offering the search engine provider a fee in order to have his website included 
on the search engine’s index. Eventually these new forms of advertisement led to the 
emergence of meta-tags, which are basically keywords or phases associated with a site 
but not visible on its content pages. The higher the cost of a meta-tag, the more favorable 
position bestowed upon a website within a search engine’s returned results. To illustrate: 
Google wound up the 3
rd 
quarter of 2011 with over $9.72 billion in revenue, the vast 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
9 
John Battelle, The Search: How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and Transformed 
Our Culture, 53 (2005). 
10 
Id. 
11 
Tim Mayer, Our Blog is Growing Up- And So Has Our Index (Aug. 8, 2005), 
http://www.ysearchblog.com/archives/000172.html  
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majority derived from advertising.
12 
This is relevant because Google and similarly 
situated search engines enjoy an immense amount of control over the dissemination of 
information and along with it, the dissemination of capital. 
Unlike search engines, Internet aggregators generally sift through other web 
pages, retrieving information to store in a database and ultimately present to a user.
13
 
These aggregators go by various names such as “bots,” “web crawlers,” and “screen 
scrapers,” and are capable of making thousands of database searches a minute.14 While 
some bots rely on contractual relationships with websites, others do not and must abide 
by the Robot Exclusion Standard [RES] specified by the host. The RES, “establishes a 
voluntary process through which web masters may exclude bots from designated portions 
of their sites… an owner can dictate which bots may access his web site and what they 
may view when they visit.”15 Theoretically, programmers design their robots to read a data 
file- “robots.txt”- and to consequently comply with the control directives it contains.16 In 
reality, the RES represents a rather unreliable source of protection because 
it is extremely difficult to trace requests back to an originating IP address. An IP address 
 
may send an enormous amount of requests, which can result in detection of the robot. 
However, robots may avoid detection by alternating between various IP addresses. 
When a computer requests information from another computer, the requesting 
computer submits its Internet Protocol [IP] address to the host computer, enabling the 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
12 
Google Made $9.72 Billion In Revenue Last Quarter, breakingnewsworld.net,  (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://breakingnewsworld.net/2011/10/google-made-9-72-billion-in-revenue-last-quarter/. 
13 
Sean O’Reilly, Nominative Fair Use and Internet Aggregators: Copyright and Trademark Challenges 
Posed by Bots, Web Crawlers and Screen-Scraping Technologies, 19 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 273 (2007). 
14 
Id. 
15 
Stephen Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 56 
Bus. Law 341, 345 (2000). 
16 
Id. at 1061.  
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host of the website to identify the source of incoming requests.
17 
From that point, a proxy 
server acts as the gatekeeper for all incoming and outgoing data traffic. It centralizes 
activity in order to conserve resources. 
18 
While most hosts limit their servers to local 
users, if the website is for public use or is a commercial enterprise, chances are it will 
allow remote users to access the site. While it is possible for a proxy to block a robot 
from accessing its website, this is extremely risky because it is most often times 
accomplished through a server configuration which can entirely remove a website from 
search results if performed improperly. 
Recursively crawling a site drastically increases the speed of searches. It also 
allows the aggregator site to track results and instantaneously update data.
19 
Travelocity 
and Orbitz are examples of screen scraping bots that constantly update time sensitive 
information concerning the availability, timing and prices of air travel. Consumers 
appreciate aggregation sites because they consolidate the most recent data into a single 
platform, allowing users to compare prices and giving those hungry for a deal, the 
illusion of neutrality. 
While aggregators are useful in promoting economic efficiency, there is of course, 
a downside: bots “consume the processing and storage resources of a system.”20 This 
includes for example, the servers that facilitate the functionality of websites. Servers can 
suffer from loss of data, delayed response times and even a “crash” of the website if they 
are excessively burdened with requests from remote bots.
21
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
17 
Id. 
18 
Id. 
19 
Id. at 1062. 
20 
Id. at 1061. 
21 
Id.  
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III. TRESPASS TO CHATTELS 
 
 
The host or owners of a website may assert a cause of action against a 
misbehaving robot based on the ancient doctrine of trespass to chattels. Where a crawler 
issues such an exorbitant number of requests to a host, and in doing so incapacitates or 
damages the host’s servers, some courts have upheld trespass to chattels actions.22 
However, in most situations the real concern of the complaining party is not actual 
 
damage to its web site, but rather an actual or perceived loss of competitive advantage 
when potential customers bypass its alluring content in favor of an aggregation site that 
includes prices and products from its competitors. Accordingly, this position is widely 
criticized due to concerns over public policy. Most notably, critics of the trespass claim’s 
application to crawlers and search engines contend that a restriction on the capabilities of 
robots will hinder the free flow of information and commerce over the web.
23 
Consumers 
stand to benefit from the use of aggregators because they assume the task of allocating 
the consumer’s time and resources in the most economically efficient manner. For 
instance, aggregators that consolidate competitive prices in a single platform may enable 
a consumer to make an educated decision in a shorter amount of time. The application of 
the trespass doctrine to Internet aggregators leaves the court with the task of identifying 
instances of concrete interference with a chattel in a context predominated by property 
that is almost always intangible. Applying a doctrine that turns on a showing of physical 
disposition fails to fully realize and address the true concern- loss of competitive 
advantage. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
22 
Id. See also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
23 
Brief of Amici Curie in Support of Bidder’s Edge, Inc., Appellant, Supporting Reversal (June 2, 2000), 
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., No. 00-15995 (9
th 
Cir.), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/belt/pubs/lemley/bedgeami.pdf.  
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A. What is a Trespass? 
 
The Restatement Second of Torts reads, “A trespass to chattel may be committed 
by intentionally… using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another, 
where the chattel is impaired to its condition, quality or value.”24 To satisfy a claim for 
trespass to chattels, the website host must show a tangible interference with his site 
occurring over a substantial amount of time. Furthermore, the Restatement emphasizes 
that the interference must be intentional and it must materially affect the interest.
25
 
B. eBay v. Bidder’s Edge 
 
The leading case involving robots under a theory of trespass to chattels is eBay v. 
Bidder’s Edge. Bidder’s Edge, an auction aggregation website employing a crawler to 
access eBay’s time sensitive auction information, sent over 100,000 queries to eBay’s 
servers each day.
26 
As the Court in eBay explained, “In order to prevail on a claim for 
trespass based on accessing a computer system, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the 
defendant intentionally and without authorization interfered with the plaintiff’s possessory 
interest in the computer system; and (2) the defendant’s unauthorized use of the system 
proximately resulted in damage to plaintiff.”27 The Court distinguished between 
reputational harm, which it defined as “misrepresentation regarding the info that Bidder’s 
Edge obtains through the use of these automated query programs,”28 and system harm, 
which encompasses the recognizable burden on the actual computer system. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
24 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (1977). 
25 
Id. § 218 cmt. E (1977). 
26 
eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp.2d at 1063. 
27 
Id. at 1070. 
28 
Id. at 1064.  
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The Court held the electronic signals Bidder’s Edge sent to retrieve eBay’s data 
evidenced tangible system harm.
29 
The holding prevailed despite evidence suggesting 
Bidder’s Edge was responsible for only 1% of eBay’s server traffic. Furthermore, eBay 
was granted an injunction even though it had failed to establish any loss of revenue.
30 
The 
Court conceded the harm was unsubstantial and would not amount to trespass or 
conversion in a tangible, real-life setting.
31 
Instead, the Court focused on the repetitive 
nature of the electronic requests issued by Bidder’s Edge, using time rather than impact 
to bolster its reasoning. The Court relied in its decision on an analogy: “If eBay were a 
brick and mortar auction house with limited seating capacity, eBay would appear to be 
entitled to reserve those seats for potential bidders, to refuse entrance to individuals (or 
robots) with no intention of bidding on any of the items, and to seek preliminary 
injunctive relief against non-customer trespassers eBay was physically unable to 
exclude.”
32
 
 
But the analogy is flawed. Contrary to the Court’s characterization, there are not a 
limited number of seats subject to theft by intruders and interlopers. There was no 
evidence that buyers and sellers on eBay were in any way impeded in communicating, 
advertising or closing sales. The lack of evidence sufficient to sustain a traditional 
trespass action- namely, evidence of substantial tangible disposition of property- led the 
court to rely on its creativity. In essence, eBay tried to force an antiquated theory 
grounded in physical realities on a fact pattern occurring entirely in cyber space. In doing 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
29 
Id. at 1069. 
30 
Id. at 1070. 
31 
Id. at 1067. 
32 
Id.  
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so, the court misconstrued and so failed to address the heart of the dispute: whether 
 
Bidder’s Edge was adversely affecting eBay’s business. 
 
The potential “physical” damage to servers is immaterial when considered in light 
of the case as a whole. Granted, the Court also posited an alternative ground for its 
holding, based on fears that if the crawler continued unchecked, “it would encourage 
other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay system 
such that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system 
unavailability or data loss.”33 While the Court addresses a valid concern regarding the 
impact of continued activity in the aggregate, it expands upon and morphs the well- 
established theory of trespass to fit its needs. A traditional trespass to chattels claim has 
yet to be sustained on a theory of future harm resulting from several trespassers. Rather 
than twisting the logic behind the trespass doctrine to make an exception, the judiciary 
would be in a better position to issue consistent, logical opinions based upon statutorily 
enacted business regulations of e-commerce. 
C. Ticketmaster: Forget the Money, Protect the Server? 
 
In 2003, a claim arose in the District Court of California between the industry 
leader in event and ticket sales, Ticketmaster Corp., and Tickets.com, Inc.- an 
aggregation website that extracted factual information such as event times, prices, and 
locations from Ticketmaster’s website via a crawler. 34 The crawler discarded the 
trademark identification and logos associated with Ticketmaster before reorganizing the 
retrieved data in the format used on its site.
35 
Ticketmaster pursued a trespass to chattels 
action, claiming that the electronic signals employed by the robot while copying the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
33 
Id. 
34 
Ticketmaster Corp., v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2003 WL 21406289, 2 (C.D.Cal. 2003). 
35 
Id.  
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relevant information were burdening its system.
36 
The decision turned on the requirement 
of, “some tangible interference with the use or operation of the computer being 
invaded… and actual dispossession of the chattel for substantial time.”37 The court found 
both the value of information obtained by the spider and the vast amount of time and 
resources Ticketmaster spent trying to thwart the spider immaterial.
38
 
The bright line approach taken by the Court in Ticketmaster most effectively 
exposes the illogical reasoning behind the application of the trespass to chattels doctrine 
to web crawlers. Finding the presence of physical evidence determinative of the trespass 
claim, the Court ignores the actual issue that Ticketmaster presents for adjudication. The 
dispute is not over Tickets.com trespassing or damaging Ticketmaster’s servers; the 
dispute is over the aggregator controlling the influx and nature of Ticketmaster’s online 
customers. In an earlier memo denying Ticketmaster a preliminary injunction, actions for 
both trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment were dismissed on the basis that the robot 
was permitted to enter the site to copy factual information.
39 
As to the latter unjust 
 
enrichment claim, the following explanation is offered: “It is hard to see how this could 
be [Tickets.com was unjustly enriched] since Tickets is not selling the tickets or 
participating in the proceeds.”40 
Perhaps the judge in the initial hearing did not possess the foresight to understand 
 
how aggregators would come to control the flow of online customers. Simply because the 
aggregator is not selling the product in dispute or deriving proceeds in connection with it 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
36 
Id. at 4. 
37 
Id. at 3. 
38 
Id. 
39 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
27, 2000). 
40 
Id.  
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does not render its impact harmless. Whether the aggregator is gaining a financial benefit 
from its immediate activity should be considered independently from whether its 
behavior materially disadvantages the host website. The Court in Ticketmaster errs in 
manipulating the theory behind a civil action in tort, illogically extending it to a dispute 
grounded in business and agency relationships. 
In the 1970’s, databases were stored on mainframe computers, which were often 
kept isolated in rooms with special climate controls.
41 
Four decades of technological 
development including the advent of cloud computing eliminates any justification 
supporting a trespass to chattels claim against a web crawler. 
IV. BREACH OF CONTRACT AND AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
When a robot exceeds the scope of the website’s terms and conditions, the host 
may have a claim for breach of contractual duties. While the RES contains computer 
code dictating the limitations to a robot’s access, the terms and conditions of a website 
are generally binding on all users- humans and bots alike. Most terms-of-use agreements 
compliment a site’s RES by enumerating the permissible ways in which data retrieved by 
a crawler can be used after the crawler leaves the site as opposed to restricting its access 
while on the site. 
Contract law has dubbed the provisions within these agreements “click-wrap” and 
“browse-wrap” terms. Click-wrap terms require a user to scroll through its mandates and 
either initial them or click on a button that indicates acceptance in order to gain access to 
the site or application.
42 
On the other hand, “browse-wrap terms” involve information 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
41 
Jane Kuafman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The Emerging Law of Commercial 
Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 Bus. Law. 213, 230 (2000). 
42 
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2002).  
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made available on websites for users to access, but not to download.
43 
The primary 
difference between click and browse-wrap agreements is that the latter does not require 
an affirmative action on the part of the user. In other words, browse-wrap terms may be 
enforceable without clicking, “I agree.” 
Notwithstanding the reality that most Internet users spend about as much time 
reviewing these terms as it takes them to click the accept button, they are often pivotal in 
leveraging a website’s claims against both ordinary users and robots. Web crawlers are 
considered users and must adhere to a site’s terms and conditions just as if the bot were a 
student accessing the site from his laptop at home. Although creating a somewhat sticky 
situation for those employing web crawlers, the application of standard contract and 
agency theory suggests the Courts may be pointing the finger at the wrong party. 
A. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act & E-SIGN 
 
The objective underlying the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act [UETA] is to 
facilitate the growth and efficiency of automated contracts.
44 
Of particular interest is the 
act’s provision providing for the formation of a contract through an automated 
transaction, “with an electronic agent or on both sides, even if no human being reviewed 
the results of the agent’s actions.”45 The act enables one to be bound by the actions of an 
electronic agent, regardless of whether the party receives notice of the results of the 
agent’s conduct. Implicating such sweeping liability raises the question, what is an 
electronic agent? 
Written in support of the UETA before its adoption by 47 states and the District 
 
of Columbia, E-SIGN is an act containing two very important provisions that clarify the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
43 
Id. 
44 
Stephen Middlebrook & John Muller, supra, note 12, at 349. 
45 
Id.  
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ambiguities involved in identifying electronic agents.
46 
The act defines an agent as, 
“something that acts without review or action by an individual at the time of the action or 
response.”47 The second provision is similar to the UETA, authorizing an electronic agent 
to enter in contracts: 
A contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely 
because its formation, creation or delivery involved the action of one or more 
electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronic agent is attributable 
to the person to be bound.
48
 
 
Presume, as do virtually all courts, a robot’s ability to enter into automated contracts on 
behalf of those operating them. Where questions of law are removed, as they are here, it 
naturally follows that most disputes turn on issues of fact. In most cases, issues of fact 
arise over whether or not the robot actually agreed to these terms. 
B. Instances of Breaching Bots: Ticketmaster and Verio 
 
Claims involving click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements continue to appear 
with increasing frequency. Recent decisions lean towards implicating the injured party’s 
“obligation to read.” What if the party (or robot) cannot read? Or better yet, can a court 
hold a web crawler liable for failing to notice a website’s terms of use? 
The Court in Ticketmaster answered in the affirmative, holding that a notice of 
Ticketmaster’s terms located at the bottom of its home page was sufficient to place 
Tickets.com under a contractual duty to abide by the provisions.
49 
The notice stipulated 
that anyone proceeding past the initial splash page was subject to Ticketmaster’s terms 
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and conditions prohibiting the commercial use of any information obtained from its site.
50
 
 
The Court explained a contract is formed when a user continues past a website’s initial 
page, exploring interior subsequent pages with knowledge of the conditions accepted by 
doing so.
51 
In some instances, presumptive knowledge can supplant actual knowledge. 
This caveat implicates the party (presumably versed in the industry and aware of the 
obstacles confronting robots) operating the crawler. 
A year later, the decision in Register.com v. Verio offered a similar rationale for 
binding a web crawler to the conditions of a site absent an affirmative act of acceptance. 
In Verio, a spider sent queries to Register.com’s servers, which returned the data 
requested almost instantaneously.
52 
After receiving the data, Verio subsequently received 
a message from Register outlining its terms of use and prohibiting robot access to its 
database of customer contact information.
53 
Verio contended that although it was in clear 
violation of Register’s conditions, it could not be held liable for breach of contract 
because it received notice of the conditions after receipt of the data; therefore, Verio 
claimed that its crawler did not accept the terms and could not enter into a contractual 
relationship. 
The Court discarded this argument, finding Verio bound to Register’s terms 
despite a lack of explicit acceptance of said terms by the robot.
54 
The decision describes a 
situation, in which a boy removes an apple off of a roadside fruit stand and takes a bite 
only to realize- his teeth deeply gorged in the apple’s core- a sign indicating their price.55 
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If the boy continues to eat an apple each day thereafter and refuses to pay because each 
time, he failed to notice the price on the sign until after he had already consumed the 
apple, he would be liable to the vendor for breach of contract. The Second Restatement of 
Contracts explains, “Silence and inaction operate as an acceptance where an offerree 
takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and 
reason to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation.”56 
While Verio is convincing mostly due to the theories behind contract law, it 
demonstrates that some courts are willing to hold robots responsible for a site’s terms and 
conditions even if the robot did not agree to them. Similar to the decision in Ticketmaster, 
which found notice sufficient to be contractually binding without a robot’s acceptance, 
the Court treats Register’s terms as browse-wrap agreements, finding the crawler liable 
absent an affirmative indication of acceptance. A court will likely find the existence of a 
contract without express authorization where: (1) the user has adequate notice of the 
existence of proposed terms; (2) has a meaningful opportunity to review the terms; (3) 
has adequate notice that a specified action manifests assent to the terms; and (4) the user 
takes the latter action.
57
 
 
The outcomes of Verio and Ticketmaster reflect the judiciary’s expectation that 
those conducting business in the online community are aware of and adhere to industry 
standards. The prevalence of terms-of-use agreements has led many courts to presume 
knowledge of these agreements on behalf of online commercial entities. It may initially 
seem counter-intuitive to hold an individual or an entity responsible for the actions of a 
robot. After all, these crawlers are not exactly malicious reincarnations akin to Mary 
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Shelley’s Frankenstein; they collect and neatly organize information. However, the 
information belongs to the host. 
A breach of contract claim offers a preferable theory by which to allocate liability 
to an aggregator than the theory underlying trespass claims. The contract claim is better 
suited to redress economic wrongs suffered by the host because it claims as the private 
exclusive material of the host, information wrongfully obtained on its website. As a result, 
public policy concerns exists over whether a website may claim as private, exclusive 
material what it posts on the Internet and the effects this could have on the free flow of 
information and e-commerce. On the other hand, the UETA and E-Sign provide 
the much-needed statutory departure from physical evidence, enabling robots to enter into 
contracts in the absence of both a written signature and an affirmative acceptance of an 
electronic contract. 
 
 
 
V. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE 
A prima facie case for a civil tort action of interference with potential economic 
advantage requires a showing of the following elements: (1) “the existence of a specific 
prospective economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party with a 
probability of future economic benefit; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the probability 
of such a future economic relationship; (3) the defendant's intentional acts to disturb that 
relationship; (4) proof of actual interference with that relationship; and (5) damages the 
defendant's international acts proximately caused.”58 
 
Website hosts assert this cause of action on the basis that the robot or search 
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engine wrongfully interferes with the host’s economic relationship with its customers by 
exposing them to the options or price comparisons of competitors. However, this claim 
rarely ever succeeds because the crux of the action depends on proof of an actual 
interference between the host’s website and specific customers. Hosts rarely satisfy this 
element because “mere hope of a future relationship”59 between the host and a customer 
is insufficient. Furthermore, the host must present evidence of malicious intent to 
disadvantage his business. Though a tortious interference claim may survive summary 
judgment, this element usually hammers a nail through the heart of its success. 
In Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., the plaintiff airline pursued a claim 
for tortious interference against a software application that aggregated flight prices for its 
users, occasionally diverting customers to the website of competitor airlines where they 
purchased cheaper flights.
60 
A preliminary motion to dismiss Southwest’s claim was not 
granted because, “there was a reasonable probability that customers who purchased 
[their] tickets on defendant's application would have entered into a contractual 
relationship directly with Southwest”; that some prospective relationships do not form 
because defendant wrongfully diverts customers to other airlines; and that defendant's 
acts impair Southwest's marketing efforts.”61 It is important to recall that Southwest was 
responding to a motion for summary judgment of the tortuous interference with economic 
 
advantage claim. Due to the lower standard of requisite probability necessary, tortious 
interference claims that survive summary judgment are generally dismissed upon 
resolution of the case. 
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To illustrate the flip side of tortious interference with economic advantage, 
consider a case appearing in Maryland’s District Court between a host website and two 
competitors who infiltrated the plaintiff’s hotel website, embedding a hyperlink which 
allowed customers to deep link from the host’s website to its competitor’s sites where the 
customers could book alternative hotel and travel accommodations.
62 
The Court in Fare 
Deals Ltd., v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc. dismissed the tortious interference claim at 
trial due to lack of any malicious intent to harm the owner's business relationships.
63
 
Unlike the summary judgment standard, to impose liability upon an entity for tortious 
 
interference with economic advantage, the plaintiff must offer proof of the alleged 
tortfeasor’s intentional malicious act. Though this cause of action reaches the core of 
most disputes involving aggregators, attempting to provide remedy for the unjustified 
loss of competitive advantage, the scienter requirement precludes its success in most 
cases. Admittedly, there exists a practical argument that a competitor intends to 
maliciously harm a business it competes with by diverting its customers. However, host 
plaintiffs are generally unable to prove that those employing the robots are doing so for 
any other reason but for the benefit of their own business. 
 
 
 
VI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS 
 
 
 
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power, “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
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Discoveries.”64 To this end, intellectual property legislation balances the protection of the 
rights and incentive belonging to authors and inventors with the public access to facts and 
information. The terms trademark and copyright are often thrown around interchangeably 
to describe a right in property that is not tangible, but they are legally distinguishable by 
what each aims to protect. Copyright protects the expression or content of a person’s 
idea, while a trademark identifies the source from which a product or service originates. 
A trademark describes something rather than being the thing described; for example, a 
company logo. 
Facts and raw data such as ticket price are not trade secrets nor are they 
copyrighted.
65 
However in some cases, even text alone, without the use of trademarked 
logos, can create sufficient confusion for the customer. While copyright law is generally a 
creature for federal courts to tame, trademark claims are subject to state laws as well as 
the federal Lanham Trademark Act. 
A. Copyright Infringement 
 
i. Misappropriation 
 
Misappropriation is the common law recourse for instances of copyright 
infringement. It arises in situations where the defendant unfairly procures factual material 
belonging to a competitor, and uses the material to compete with the plaintiff.
66 
State 
laws providing for copyright claims are preempted by federal law if the material or type 
 
of work protected normally falls under copyright law and the rights asserted under state 
law are equivalent to those protected by federal law.
67
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a. Hot News Claims: International News Service v. Associated Press 
 
Very few copyright claims survive federal preemption. However, a narrow line of 
cases known as “hot news” misappropriation claims occasionally manage to skirt 
preemption by satisfying a five-pronged test for subject matter.
68 
A misappropriation 
claim will survive federal preemption where the plaintiff offers evidence of the 
following: (1) “the time-sensitive nature of the factual information; (2) free riding by the 
defendant; (3) a threat to the very existence of the product or service offered by the 
plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff generates or collects the information at some cost or expense; 
and (5) the defendant's use of the information is in direct competition with the product or 
service offered by the plaintiff.”69 Due to the immediacy of the harm posed, hot news 
misappropriation claims are the exception, rather than the rule for copyright claims. 
The cause of action for misappropriation of “hot news” finds its origins 
 
in International News Service v. Associated Press-
70 
a decision that pre-dates Erie. 
Although Erie may render the federal common law hot news claims non-binding in 
federal court, several states still recognize the cause of action. International News holds 
that breaking or hot news is the “quasi-property” of a news gathering organization 
because news gathering carries with it, “the expenditure of labor, skill, and money.”71 
The Court found that allowing one news agency to appropriate and profit from the work 
 
of another would “render publication profitless, or so little profitable as in effect to cut 
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off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison with the return.”72 In 
short, appropriation of another’s hot news “is endeavoring to reap what it has not 
sown.”73 
b. Taking a Swat at Flyonthewall.com 
 
The hot news cause of action is particularly appealing to those looking to file a 
claim against a search engine or an aggregator. Unlike the alternative causes of action, 
misappropriation departs from the over-extended requirement of physical evidence of 
injury. In addition, this doctrine requires little to no manipulation of its original elements 
in order to address the financial injury most often suffered by the plaintiff asserting a 
claim against an aggregator or a search engine. In fact, the notoriously elusive element of a 
hot news misappropriation claim- evidence of the time sensitive nature of the factual 
information- may be leniently construed to warrant satisfaction in e-commerce cases 
where the temporary crash of website lasting only five seconds can destroy a business. 
Within the invisible channels of the World Wide Web, information exchanges hands even 
quicker than the mind can process it, rendering hot news claims an ideal alternative for 
those in need of immediate relief. 
So long as the plaintiff brings a hot news action in a jurisdiction permitting its 
adjudication, the claim will not be pre-empted by federal legislation. Barclays Capital 
Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com featured an aggregator website that sold subscriptions to 
customers granting them access to compilations of Barclay’s equity research reports.74 
The Court upheld a hot news misappropriation claim, entitling Barclays to an immediate 
 
injunction prohibiting Flyonthwall.com from appropriating any further economic 
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advantage.
75 
While Barclays expended substantial funds and resources to produce the 
equity reports, which were sold to investors at a hefty price, Flyonthewall.com did not 
perform equity research of its own. In fact, Flyonthewall.com did not undertake any 
original reporting or analysis sufficient to generate an independent opinion.
76 
The 
website’s headlines consisted entirely of regurgitations of Barclay's recommendations 
and those of other investment institutions.
77 
Similar to the reasoning employed in eBay, 
Barclays was not required to show the existence of actual harm; the New York District 
Court awarded an injunction on the premise that the potential for long term aggregated 
conduct of a similar nature was sufficient to cause Barclays irreparable harm. 
78
 
The hot news misappropriation theory may receive a 21st century face life if 
 
courts continue to support its application to actions implicating search engines and 
aggregators. The level of immediacy inherent in e-commerce coupled with an absence of 
physical requirements, introduces hot news claims as one of the more coherent courses of 
action available. Although the opportunity to employ a hot news claim depends on the 
jurisdiction in which the claim is filed, misappropriation claims currently provide Courts 
with a comprehensive standard for effectively adjudicating actions against aggregators. 
ii. The Copy Right Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
The Copyright Act expressly covers nine categories of works, including 
“compilations.”79 A compilation proceeds from, “the process of selecting, bringing 
together, organizing, and arranging previously existing material of all kinds, regardless of 
whether the individual items in the material have been or ever could have been subject to 
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copyright.”80 The act does not offer protection for previously existing material included 
in the copyrighted compilation as a whole. To demonstrate, consider the following 
hypothetical: a disc jockey electronically mixes songs from The Beatles White Album 
with tracks off of Jay-Z’s Black Album. The DJ has a copyright interest in the 
compilation of the Grey Album. He does not have a copyrighted interest in the portions of 
 
“Imagine” and “Dirt Off Your Shoulder” that are not mixed together. 
The Copyright Act defines copies as, “material objects, other than phonorecords, 
in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which 
the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”81 To qualify as “fixed,” the work must be in a 
tangible medium of expression, its embodiment, “sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more 
than transitory duration.” This section of the act is particularly relevant to cases in which 
electronic signals sent to servers by crawlers rest temporarily on the data, avoiding a 
download of the copyrighted material but still managing to retrieve a copy of the 
information. 
 
In response to mounting criticism of the limitations placed on web crawlers and 
aggregators, Congress amended section 512(d) of the act to limit liability for applications 
offering any of the following services: (1) “transitory digital network communications; (2) 
system caching; (3) information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users; 
and (4) information location tools.”82 Furthermore, the amendment states that a 
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provider qualifying for protection may not be liable for monetary relief.
83 
Search engines 
received the amendments with open arms, the potential risk of financial liability lessened 
for the time being. Robots on the other hand, are absent from the list of those included in 
the Millennium Act, although they too benefitted from a general relaxation of judiciary 
rulings. 
Finally, section 107 of the Copyright Act indicates the four factors to be applied 
in determining if the use of copyrighted work is “fair.”84 Section 107 provides a defense 
for search engines and web crawlers redistributing copyrighted information that would 
otherwise be halted by an injunction if they can demonstrate that use of the material was 
“transformative.” In determining whether an electronic agent’s use of copyright material 
is fair, the Court must consider the following: (1) the purpose of use of copyrighted 
material; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
copyrighted work used in proportion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
effect of the use on the copyrighted work’s fair market value.85 
a. Ticketmaster: Stick to the Facts 
 
Revisiting the Ticketmaster decision provides a basis for the application of 
Section 107 to aggregator cases. In Ticketmaster, the Court applied the four-factor fair 
use analysis to an infringement claim, concluding the electronic signals sent by 
Tickets.com’s robot should be not prohibited from temporarily copying factual 
information. First assessing the use of the information, the Court found Tickets.com 
obtained a benefit from the data obtained. Thus, commercial use of the information 
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weighed in favor of Ticketmaster.
86 
Next however, signals from the robot which 
temporarily rested on Ticketmaster’s system while copying factual information was 
deemed permissible because raw facts are not subject to copyright protection under 
section 101 of the Copyright Act.
87 “What is protected is the manner or mode of 
expression of those facts.”88 Since the data copied by the spider did not qualify for 
copyright protection, the third and fourth prongs of analysis were immaterial. 
b. Transformative Trans-Media in Kelly v. Arriba 
 
Section 107’s four-factor fair use test yields unsatisfactory results due to the 
Copyright Act’s emphasis on concrete evidence; namely, its requirement of “material 
copies”89 to be “fixed” in tangible mediums of expression.90 Emphasizing physicality 
prevents the court from reaching a resolution that addressed the actual dispute. It is 
apparent that claims against aggregators very rarely prioritize any disposition of real 
property, but rather are asserted to acquire control over business relationships. Courts 
attach an inordinate significance to the transformative factor, aggrandizing its importance 
to the unforeseen detriment of the plaintiff. The permissibility of copyrighted work is 
directly proportional to extent of the work’s transformative nature. Support for this 
contention is based on the erroneous assumption that a new or transformative type of 
business is less likely to adversely impact the original owner of the copyrighted work. In 
reality, search engines and web crawlers are using their transformative nature to ascend to 
level of control superseding online retailers and merchants- a process which will ultimately 
erode the latter’s business. 
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Ruling on a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the Court in Kelly v. 
Arriba found the search engine employed by Arriba to operate within contours of the fair 
use doctrine in so far as it reproduced and displayed thumbnail images.
91 Arriba’s engine 
operated by first downloading images from the Internet onto its server. Then, the crawler 
used the images to generate small, lower-resolution thumbnails of the pictures.
92 
Finally, 
the search engine deleted the pictures and provided a link to the original site from which 
the picture was derived surrounded by the Arriba banner and advertising.
93
 
 
In applying the first factor of the fair use test, the Court found the commercial 
nature of Arriba’s site to weigh only slightly against a finding of fair use because Arriba 
did not use the images to directly promote its site, nor did to attempt to gain a profit by 
selling the images.
94 
The decision delineated between the “distinct” uses for which each 
website desired the images as follows: “improving access to information on the Internet 
versus artistic expression.”95 The nature of the copyrighted data retrieved by the search 
engine was irrelevant to a ruling concerning the thumbnails because the very nature of an 
image compels inclusion of entire picture in a copy.
96 
The Court approved exact 
replications of the copyrighted work in thumbnails, but it declined to rule on the in-line 
linking to the full size images.
97
 
Rather than replacing the host’s original use of the pictures, the Court said the 
search engine created an entirely new use while simultaneously attracting users to the 
plaintiff’s site. Apparently, the Court felt the robot’s transformative utilization of the 
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pictures benefitted the plaintiff rather than infringing upon his copyright.
98 
The Court 
may be correct in its assertion at the time it rendered the opinion, but its decision reflects 
a lack of foresight. It is uncontested that at the time of the decision, Arriba directed online 
traffic to the defendant’s site. However, what if Arriba begins to direct users to other 
photography sites, who would have otherwise, arrived at the plaintiff’s? Or decides to 
charge the plaintiff a commission for each person it directs to his website? Surely it is not 
unreasonable to predict that Arriba may eventually charge a fee for favorable placement 
of the plaintiff’s site in its search result. Exaggerated reliance upon the transformative 
factor of analysis could eventually have the effect of rendering the Copyright Act’s 
protections useless. Permitting a search engine to control access to and distribution of 
one’s copyrighted work could potentially result in the owner’s loss of dominion and 
control over the work. Eventually, the owner’s formerly exclusive property right will 
instead, be subject to the discretion of the search engine. Though the Court claimed, “a 
transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the market of the original 
than a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted work,”
99 
it is precisely the 
 
transformative nature that will adversely impact the owner of the copyrighted work. 
 
c. Perfect 10 and Cartoon Network: Search Engine Safety on Home Base 
 
The decision in Perfect10, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., follows precariously in the 
footsteps of the Arriba line of though, though the former delivers a lengthy explanation 
justifying the requirement of concrete evidence. Perfect10.com- a pornographic website- 
filed a copyright infringement claim against Google for allowing its search engine to 
copy Perfect 10’s pictures and reproduce them as thumbnails in Google’s image search 
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results.
100 
Sustaining Perfect 10’s claim over the thumbnail reproductions, the Court 
alternatively concluded that the links to the larger pictures provided by the search engine 
were permissible due to an absence of prolonged physical contact between Google’s 
HTML code and the copyrighted material.
101 
The court rationalized this explanation as 
follows: Google did not copy Perfect 10’s large images, but rather communicated where 
to find that copy in HTML instructions given to an individual user’s browser.102 
Therefore it is not the HTML instructions, or by extension Google, causing the infringing 
images to appear on a user’s screen; the instructions merely provide an address. The 
browser belonging to the individual using Google engages the computer storing the 
infringing imagine. The court’s decision turns on this interaction- when an individual 
user deploys his or her browser- and not the actions of the crawler, to allocate 
responsibility for infringement of Perfect 10’s material. 
Similarly, a recent case between C.S. Holdings Inc.- a digital video recording 
company- and Cartoon Network, resulted in a decision based primarily on the nature and 
duration of an electronic agent’s physical contact with copyrighted material.103 The Court 
held, “copyrighted television programs and movies in data buffers used to allow 
customers to record programming on a digital video recorder (DVR) system at a remote 
location did not last for period of more than transitory duration, and therefore were not 
“fixed,” as required to qualify as a “copy” under the Copyright Act, where no bit of data 
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remained in any buffer for more than 1.2 seconds, and each bit of data was rapidly and 
automatically overwritten as soon as it was processed.”104 
The decisions in both Perfect 10 and Cartoon Network demonstrate the inability of 
the doctrine of copyright infringement to address the loss of competitive advantage 
involved in claims against electronic robots. A copyright infringement claim depends 
entirely upon concrete tangible proof. In focusing on the amount of time the DVR 
technology spent in contact with the copyrighted material, the Court in Cartoon Network 
ignores the fact that the reproduction of Cartoon Network’s shows is causing them to 
loose revenue. This result seems unfair considering the network expended all the time, 
money and resources necessary to produce its shows; the network also expended the all 
the time, money and resources necessary to obtain a copyright for their contents. It does 
not logically follow that one should look to the level of efficiency of the technology 
employed to obtain the benefits deriving from the copyrighted work in determining 
whether or not an infringement occurs. An identical line of reasoning exposes the error in 
the Perfect 10 Court’s logic. Whether or not Google receives a substantial benefit from the 
appropriation of the website’s copyrighted material should be determinative, not a 
technicality involving the exact physical location of the copyrighted material in relation 
to lines of computer code. 
 
VII. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
The purpose of trademark law is to prevent producers from free-riding on their 
rivals' mark,
105 
and to identify the source of services and products.
106 
Trademark 
infringement is largely a state claim, finding support in the common law trade secret 
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doctrine as well. The doctrine generally protects, “valuable, confidential business 
information from misappropriation where the holder takes reasonable measures to 
maintain its secrecy.”107 The common law trade secret doctrine provides an alternative to 
the federal cause of action for those looking to combat the retrieval queries of robots. 
Most often however, this approach is discarded due to an absence of reasonable measures 
taken to maintain the business information’s secrecy. Most sites subject to queries from 
spiders permit remote access, which exposes its database and eliminates the chance to 
apply the common law trade secret doctrine. 
A. Federal Trademark and Unfair Competition Acts 
 
The Lanham Trademark Act is a federal statute meant to supplement the causes in 
state action for trademark infringement. According to Lanham, “Trademark is limited to 
property right in a particular word, phrase or symbol.”108 Competitors may use a rival’s 
trademark in advertising and other channels of communication if use is not false or 
misleading.
109 
For those seeking a cause of action, section 1114 prohibits unfair 
competition, or the unauthorized use in commerce of registered marks.
110 
The fair-use 
 
defense available is outlined rather roughly as, “forbidding the trademark registrant to 
appropriate a descriptive terms for exclusive use and prevent others from accurately 
describing the characteristics of their goods.”111 
B. Nominative Fair Use Doctrine 
 
The fair use doctrine is bifurcated into two lines of thought. Classic fair use 
occurs, “where the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark to describe the defendant’s 
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product.”112 To the contrary, nominative fair use occurs, “when the alleged infringer uses 
the [trademark holder’s] product even if the alleged infringer’s ultimate goal is to describe 
his own product.” Courts have recognized situations in which there is no substitute for the 
use of a trademark, for example- Scotch tape.
113
 
The trouble is this doctrine is a judicially constructed and created concept, 
 
meaning there is an absence of statutory authority to lend guidance or clarification to the 
theory’s ambiguities.114 Furthermore, less than half of the federal circuits have 
encountered the doctrine and a circuit split exists as to the manner of its application.
115
 
i. Ninth Circuit Standard 
 
Under the “nominative fair use” test adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, a defendant must prove: (1) that the product or service in question is one not 
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) that only so much of the mark or 
marks is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) that 
the user did nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.
116 
In the Ninth Circuit, if these elements are 
proven, the use is “fair” and defendant will prevail. 
ii. Third Circuit Standard 
 
The Third Circuit first determines whether the plaintiff can show that confusion is 
likely due to the defendant's use of plaintiff's mark/information (in which case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show that its nominative use of plaintiff's mark, 
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information, or both is nonetheless fair). If this confusion test is satisfied, the court then 
asks (1) whether the use of the plaintiff's mark is necessary to describe (A) the plaintiff's 
product or service and (B) the defendant's product or service; (2) whether only so much 
of the plaintiff's mark is used as is necessary to describe plaintiff's products or services; 
and (3) whether the defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and accurate 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant's products or services.
117
 
 
C. TMs and Ticketmaster 
 
Claims against aggregators and search engines arise when material or information 
has been compiled in a manner that leads a user to believe the aggregator or search 
engine is in some way connected with the trademark. If a court encounters this situation, 
it may elect to evaluation the infringement claim with the 
Revisiting Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. provides for an illustration of 
trademark doctrine application to allegedly infringing aggregator. Applying the 9
th 
Circuit 
standard, the California District Court found no infringement existed because although 
Tickets.com framed the information in their window, each hyper-link was clearly labeled 
as directing the user to Ticketmaster’s site reducing any consumer confusion that may 
have existed.
118 
Furthermore, the aggregator would, “extract the factual info (event date, 
time, tickets prices and URL) and discard the rest, which consisted of TM identification, 
logos, ads, and other information which TX did intend to 
use.”119 Thus, Ticketmaster’s sale of the tickets could not be referenced without use of its 
trademark; however, the court found the aggregator’s use to be fair use because it only 
utilized the trademark to the extent necessary and pursued measures to reduce consumer 
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confusion by clearly marking the hyperlinks and indicating to the user that they would be 
re-directed to Ticketmaster’s website. 
Although the Ninth Circuit standard applied to Ticketmaster, courts who encounter 
a Third Circuit standard because the consumer confusion preliminary assessment favors 
the aggregators and search engines. They may receive the benefit of application of the 
Third Circuit standard due to the beneficial services aggregators and search engines 
provide for consumers and the consequent public policy tenets supporting their continued 
use. Also, the Supreme Court has indicated that a degree of consumer confusion is 
compatible with fair use, suggesting an inclination towards applying the Third Circuit 
standard. Where an aggregator involves a trademark, infringement doctrine provides a 
satisfactory course of recovery because it targets the conducts effect on consumers and 
thus addresses the consequences of the electronic agent’s conduct relating to loss of 
competitive advantage. Rather than focusing on how long a search engine or crawler 
physically copied or made contact with a trademark, the court looks to circumstantial 
evidence- for example, the framing of the trademark or hyper link- to determine whether 
the electronic agent appropriated benefits exclusively under the 
control of the trademark holder. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Today, both the country and the economy are struggling with an international 
transition from a marketplace of tangible products, to one revolving around the exchange 
of information. The dawning of the “Information Age” introduced an era in which a 
multi-billion dollar marketplace of intangibles exists; however, legislation cannot keep up 
as it attempts to apply old methods rooted in the tangible. Ambiguous case law coupled 
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with an absence of statutory provisions concerning online commercial transactions attest 
for the legal system’s inability to recognize the occurrence of tremendous alterations to 
the infrastructure of the economy. Now more so than ever, the economy is not defined by 
national boundaries, but rather created by international players. Companies like Google 
and Facebook have in effect, surpassed the authority of the nation state by revolutionizing 
the ways in which business transactions occur. A legal study of these transactions is 
particularly relevant as legislation such as Stop Online Piracy Act aim to allow the U.S. 
Department of Justice, as well as copyright holders, to seek court orders against websites 
accused of enabling or facilitating copyright infringement. Whether SOPA is the 
legislation to regulate e-commerce remains to be seen, but the current application of 
actions with physical requirements is clearly insufficient. The judiciary lags behind the 
economy in its current adjudication of claims relating to search engines and web crawlers 
as it struggles to apply antiquated doctrines that fail to substantiate the business and 
financial disadvantages that lay at the heart of e-commerce disputes. 
